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Banks and Banking: Institutions and Markets

Using instruments of institutional analysis in banking sector is rather promising. The information asymmetry paradigm, the theory of hold-up and rent-seeking, the trust and social capital concepts – all these allow for a new insight into the problems of the existence of banks, their relationships with lenders, borrowers, regulators and supervisors. Our projects deal with different aspects banking (including various banking markets, as well as regulation issues) and households’ financial behavior in Russia and other emerging economies, as well as in a cross-country prospective.

selected PUBLICATIONS
— Semenova M., Andrievskaya I. Does biological endowment matter for demand for financial services? Evidence from 2D:4D ratio in the Russian household survey // Personality and Individual Differences. 2017. Vol. 104. P. 155-165.
— Semenova M., Andrievskaya I. Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence // Journal of Financial Stability. 2016. Vol. 23. P. 33-50.
— Semenova M., Kulikova V. Informal Loans in Russia: Why Not to Borrow from a Bank? // Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies. 2016. Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 1650016-1-1650016-41.
— Semenova M., Andrievskaya I. K. 
Market Discipline in the Interbank Market: Evidence from Russia // Eastern European Economics. 2015. Vol. 53. No. 2. P. 69-98.
— Semenova M., Savchenko P. V. Sitting on the fence: does having a ‘dual-director’ add to bank profitability? // Applied Economics Letters. 2015. Vol. 22. No. 8. P. 654-657.
— Pyle W., Schoors K., Semenova M., Yudaeva K. Bank Depositor Behavior in Russia in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis // Eurasian Geography and Economics. 2012. Vol. 53. No. 2. P. 267-284.
— Semenova M. Market discipline and banking system transparency: Do we need more information? //Journal of Banking Regulation. 2012. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 241-248.
— Semenova M. Information Sharing in Credit Markets: Incentives for Incorrect Information Reporting //The Journal of Comparative Economic Studies. 2008. Vol. 50. No. 3. P. 381-415.

Researchers: Maria Semenova
Contact person: Мaria Semenova

 

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