

# Ancestral Shocks and Political Attitudes of Immigrants: Evidence from the European Refugee Crisis\*

Alexander Yarkin<sup>†</sup>

February 2021

## Abstract

This paper explores how salient events happening abroad can affect local attitudes and behaviors via the networks of ancestral/ethnic ties. Specifically, the paper focuses on the European Refugee Crisis in 2014-2016, and demonstrates how attitudes towards immigrants, ideological conservatism, and voting patterns of people living in the US and in Europe who trace their ancestry to different (sub)regions in Europe react to the inflow of refugees and corresponding attitudinal change in their ancestral homelands. As a first step, the paper documents that such cross-border political spillovers are significant and large, and operate along the ethnic lines. Second, it attempts to establish the mechanism(s) of how ancestral/ethnic ties still matter for the formation of political and social attitudes, focusing on social media (Facebook, Twitter) ties and other media coverage as mechanisms.

---

\*I'm very grateful to Pedro Dal Bo, Ruben Durante, Oded Galor, Sergei Guriev, Stephanie Kang, Brian Knight, Stelios Michalopoulos, and Matthias Schief, for their valuable comments and suggestions. This research has also benefited from seminar and conference participants at Brown and Harvard (Government).

<sup>†</sup>Alexandr Yarkin: Brown University, Department of Economics, 64 Waterman street, Providence, RI, USA, alexander\_yarkin@brown.edu.

# 1 Introduction

This research project explores how salient events happening in the ancestral homeland of a person can affect his or her attitudes and behaviors, being transmitted via the networks of ethnic/immigrant ties. Specifically, the project focuses on the massive inflow of refugees in Europe in 2014-2016 - along with its significant social, economic, and political consequences in European host countries (see Appendix Figure A1 for the illustration of the variation I'm using). While the direct effects of the Crisis on European economic and political landscape have been studied extensively (see, e.g., Dustmann et al. (2019) and Steinmayr (2020)), the literature so far has remained silent about whether and how such salient events can exert spillover effects, causing attitudinal and behavioral change in places that might not be directly affected by the event itself. This project explores such an opportunity and attempts to establish that attitudes towards immigrants, voting patterns, and political conservatism of people living elsewhere (in the US or in other places in Europe) who trace their ancestries to different countries in Europe react to the inflow of refugees in their European homelands. I attempt to both document that such a cross-border spillover effects are significant, and also to establish the mechanism of how ancestral/ethnic ties still matter for the formation of political and social attitudes, focusing on social media (Facebook, Twitter) networks and standard media coverage of the events as mechanisms (forthcoming).

At this point, I have three sets of suggestive evidence for the importance of spillovers of ancestral shocks via the immigrant/ethnic networks. First, evidence from the European Social Survey (ESS) reveals that for immigrants living in a given country, their attitudes towards immigrants from the outside of Europe strongly follow the corresponding attitudes in the their ancestral homeland. Moreover, these effects are especially strong for time periods when the issue of immigration is particularly important (during the Refugee Crisis), and for places where the issue is important (ancestral countries that are most affected by the Crisis). Thus, I document a set of regularities for how salient events force cultural spillovers.

A second set of results focuses on the US and uses the data from the General Social Survey (GSS), revealing that people in the US are becoming more conservative following a larger inflow of refugees in their ancestral country in Europe (accounting for ancestral FEs, time FEs, and other potential confounders). These results are stronger for 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants as compared to 4th and higher generations, which provides some evidence for weakening of social/attention ties as people assimilate in the US. An interesting exception - a negative effect of 'refugee treatment' on conservatism - is for people who trace

their ancestry to Germany<sup>1</sup>. I am currently working with the newly obtained geocoded data from the GSS to link GSS respondents to counties and ZIP codes to further address local 'peer effects' as well as dig deeper into the mechanisms.

Additional important evidence on the importance of ancestral/ethnic social networks as mechanisms for the transmission of norms and beliefs comes from Facebook friendships links. The data from Facebook reveals that counties in the US that have a higher share of people with a certain European ancestry also have a significantly higher share of friendships with people from that European country. Thus, it seems that the ancestral composition of local population still affects the connectivity of people to their ancestral countries today via social media. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that one of the mechanisms behind the effects that I'm finding has something to do with the acquisition of information from abroad via ancestral/immigrant networks.

I'm currently working on linking these results to the US county-level voting patterns between 2012 and 2016 to check if the intensity of 'refugee treatment' in the ancestral country can be part of the reason behind the right-wing shift in the 2016 preidential elections<sup>2</sup>.

## **Contribution to the Literature**

The effects of the Refugee Crisis in Europe have recently been extensively explored, see, e.g., Altindag and Kaushal (2020) on voting in Turkey following the inflow of refugees from Syria, Dustmann et al. (2019) for Denmark and differences in reactions to refugees between urban and rural locations, and Hangartner et al. (2019) on hostility towards out-groups in Greece following the inflow of refugees. Steinmayr (2020) also shows that the type of contact matters: in places where refugees actually stayed for longer period and interacted with locals, far-right votes decreased; while in places where refugees were just passing through, far-right votes increased, underpinning the postulates of the contact theory (Allport, 1954). This paper can add an important dimension to this literature, namely, the spillover effects of the Crisis on less affected places in Europe and the US.

Relatedly, this project can potentially contribute to the explanations of right-wing trends and polarization in Europe and the US, see Boxell et al. (2020) for the affective polarization, Dal Bo et al. (2019) on the rise of Sweden Democrats, and Autor et al. (2017) for importing

---

<sup>1</sup>Anecdotal evidence that I have at this point suggests that this is due to the type of media coverage of the refugee crisis in Germany and Chancellor Merkel's publicly expressed positions.

<sup>2</sup>I'm using the USA elections data from American National Election Studies (ANES) as well as the more detailed microdata from CCES to check if changes in the vote shares between 2012 and 2016 elections reflect the ancestral compositions of counties and the corresponding situation with the Refugee Crisis in the ancestral European countries.

polarization in the US via the exposure to Chinese trade exports.

This project also relates to a broader literature on the lasting effects of ancestral characteristics (geography, history, etc.) on norms and attitudes, see, e.g., Fernández (2007) Fernandez and Fogli (2006, 2009), Alesina et al. (2013), Galor and Özak (2016), among others. While most of these papers focus on cultural persistence and vertical transmission of attitudes and behaviors within the family, I add a horizontal 'ethnic' dimension of cultural transmission to the story. Thus, while the 'epidemiological approach' to cultural evolution was mostly assuming that the relevant sets of actors are within the family and that 'peer effects' are virtually zero, this project suggests a broader view of how culture evolves along the lines of ethnicity and ancestry.

Thereby, another big literature that this paper relates to is the literature on peer effects, see e.g., Angrist (2014), and for peer effects on networks, see Bramoullé et al. (2020). Especially relevant are a few papers where the authors explore peer effects in cultural transmission: Dohmen et al. (2012), Ahern et al. (2014). However, there are no papers that I am aware of that would explore the way that ancestral shocks to norms and values affects those of (the descendants of) immigrants<sup>3</sup>.

?

## 2 Conceptual Framework

Forthcoming...

## 3 Data and Empirical Strategy


### 3.1 Data

I use the Eurostat and UNHCR monthly and yearly data on numbers, age, gender, and ancestry composition of asylum seekers and refugees for each European 'host' country. Figure 1 gives the yearly time series of shares of asylum seekers in the overall population of a country,

---

<sup>3</sup>One exception may be Barsbai et al. (2017) where the authors explore how immigrants can affect the diffusion of democratic values back into their home country, Moldova. But this paper looks at the inverse of this transmission. Additionally, there is a recent paper by Tian et al. (2020) that explores how ancestral attitudes and behaviors can be relevant for the spread of COVID-19 and related social distancing behaviors. Bailey et al. (2020) analyze similar network effects in the context of COVID, but without any reference to ancestral/ethnic ties.

by country of asylum. I use this data to show that the spillover effects are most significant in the time periods and in places when and where the issue of refugees and immigration is most salient.



Graphs by Country of asylum

Figure 1: Asylum seekers share in population by country of asylum

To construct measures of social and political attitudes, I use the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) that also includes information on the ancestral origins of respondents (if parents were not born in a country of interview), as well as individual characteristics and regional covariates matched from the Eurostat. I use similar data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to measure political and social attitudes in the US, with an important difference that I can measure the "generation" of ancestry (from 1st to 4th and above). Unfortunately, the GSS does not provide public data on respondents' locations, but currently I am working with the GSS to get geocoded data on respondents' counties and ZIP codes to be able to match those to local covariates and peer effects.

To measure social ties and reference/peer groups, in addition to ancestries, I use Facebook Social Connectedness Index (SCI) from Bailey et al. (2018). This index gives a measure of connectivity between pairs of geographic regions  $(i, j)$  based on Facebook friendship links as a share of maximum possible amount of links. For example, I can calculate how connected counties in the US with a higher share of people of ancestry  $j$  are to the corresponding country  $j$  in Europe.

### 3.2 Empirical strategy

To test for the existence of ancestral ties that affect political and social attitudes of immigrants, I estimate a set of Fixed Effects (FE) and Difference-in-difference (DID) models with ancestral, time, and region-of-residence FE. Main treatment variables (whether a measure of the ancestral shock, or a measure of ancestral attitudes) vary at the level of ancestry  $\times$  time. The basic model I estimate is the following:

$$Y_{i,c,t,r} = \alpha + \beta \cdot AncestralShock_{c,t} + \gamma \cdot LocalShock_{c,t} + \eta X'_{i,c,t,r} + \phi_c + \tau_t + \psi_r + \varepsilon_{i,c,t,r} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{i,c,t,r}$  is a measure of social/political attitudes of individual  $i$  living in a host country/region  $r$ , tracing ancestry to country  $c$ , interviewed at year  $t$ . The main variable of interest is  $AncestralShock_{c,t}$  that for the ancestral country measures either a share of refugees taken by the ancestral country (direct treatment effect), or the average social attitudes of the same type as the outcome variable (cultural transmission effect). To make sure that we are capturing the effects of the ancestral changes, which, in principle, can be correlated with local changes in how the Refugee Crisis unfolds, or how local attitudes change, I include a measure of local attitudinal change  $LocalShock_{c,t}$ , defined either at the country or the regional level. I also control for a rich set of regional and individual variables captured by  $X'_{i,c,t,r}$ , as well as for time FE,  $\tau_t$ , and place (country or subnational unit) of residence FE,  $\psi_r$ . I allow for various modes of error clustering, but in all the cases, errors  $\varepsilon_{i,c,t,r}$  are clustered at least at the level of ancestral country (and for robustness I do multi-way clustering).

Most importantly, this design allows me to account for the ancestral FEs  $\phi_c$  - somethings that is not possible in the usual 'epidemiological approach' to culture. Most often, when a research tries to establish the effects of ancestral culture or other ancestral characteristics on immigrants' culture or preferences (like in, e.g., Fernandez and Fogli (2006), Luttmer and Singhal (2011), Alesina et al. (2013), Galor and Özak (2016)), there emerges an important concern of whether there are unobserved characteristics of ancestral countries/places that

affect the ancestral culture/characteristic, so the identification becomes problematic. Here, this particular problem is addressed because I identify cultural/event spillover effects by looking, effectively, at the effects of *changes* in the ancestral culture/characteristic on *changes* in culture/opinions of immigrants.

This research design also addresses two additional important issues prevalent in the literature on peer effects and cultural change. First, peer effects can easily be confused with the endogenous choice of peers, i.e., when better motivated students select better motivated friends, outcomes in terms of grades tend to be correlated, which is not due to any causal peer 'effects' - the so-called correlated group effects, Manski (1993). The same phenomenon also occurs when 'peers' receive common shocks. Both of these causes of correlated group effects do not apply to the set-up in this paper, because we have exogenous group assignment (ethnicity/ancestry), and different countries of residence by design.

A second important issue that I address with this design is the selection into treatment based on local-level culture and attitudes. This issue is very salient for any research question about the effects of the Refugee Crisis on culture in Europe, because cultural and attitudinal changes affect the extent to which people are exposed to the Crisis, unless there is an exogenous variation in what areas get higher/lower exposure to refugees (see, e.g., Dustmann et al. (2019), Steinmayr (2020), etc.). In the context of this project, however, - especially when looking at the Europe-US spillovers - this selection issue is not present.

Additional benefit of some of the data that I use is that it allows me to construct ancestral 'peer groups' based on similarity along several potentially important dimensions, such as political ideology, education, etc. In particular, to test whether cultural attention ties and cultural spillovers are driven mostly by spillovers from similar groups, I construct separate ancestral cultural and political variables, averaged within subgroups by education level, left-right ideology, and other important dimensions. Thus, I estimate the following model:

$$Y_{i,c,t,r,g} = \alpha + \sum_{g=1}^G \beta \cdot AncestralShock_{c,t,g} + \gamma \cdot LocalShock_{c,t} + \eta X'_{i,c,t,r} + \phi_c + \tau_t + \psi_r + \varepsilon_{i,c,t,r} \quad (2)$$

where  $AncestralShock_{c,t,g}$  is a measure of average attitudes in the ancestral country for each subgroup  $g$  (where groups can be defined with respect to education level, political leanings, etc.).

## 4 Preliminary Findings

### 4.1 Refugee Crisis and Transmission of Attitudes within Europe

The first set of results in this section demonstrates that attitudes towards immigrants in Europe of people who live not in their ancestral homeland (for example, a person of German ancestry living in Norway) are affected by the attitudinal change in their ancestral homelands. Thereby, I establish that there exists a significant spillover effect of cultural/political norms and beliefs that is transmitted via ethnic networks. Moreover, this effect is especially strong and significant when the issue (the topic of immigration, refugees, etc.) is particularly salient, i.e., during the Refugee Crisis, and where it is most salient, i.e., for people tracing their ancestries to most affected countries.

In particular, Table 1 below shows that 2nd generation immigrants in Europe react strongly to the attitudinal change in their ancestral country regarding whether immigrants make country a better place. Moreover, as column (2) indicates, this effect is most apparent in the years during and following the Refugee Crisis. Columns (3) and (4) further show that this effect is only there for immigrants from heavily affected countries (such as Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Greece, and Austria).

Table 1: Spillovers of attitudes towards immigrants: make country a better place

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Full Sample Imm. good	Full Sample Imm. good	High Exposure Imm. good	Low Exposure Imm. good
Immigrants good (ancestral)	0.215* (0.107)	0.120 (0.115)	0.435** (0.136)	0.095 (0.117)
Immigrants good (ancestral) x Post		0.229*** (0.081)		
Observations	18,829	18,829	7,066	11,763
Number of Countries	35	35	10	25
Adjusted R-squared	0.115	0.116	0.137	0.112
Ancestral FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 2 shows the same results for the attitudes towards immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe.

Table 2: Spillovers of attitudes towards immigrants: allow more immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe

VARIABLES	(1) Full Sample Poor.Immigr	(2) Full Sample Poor.Immigr	(3) High Exposure Poor.Immigr	(4) Low Exposure Poor.Immigr
Allow Poor. Immigrants (ancestral)	0.252*** (0.091)	0.134 (0.100)	0.368** (0.124)	0.151 (0.103)
Allow Poor. Immigrants (ancestral) x post		0.217** (0.082)		
Observations	19,071	19,071	7,121	11,950
Number of mcountry_	35	35	10	25
Adjusted R-squared	0.099	0.100	0.136	0.085
Ancestral FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

However, as is shown in Table 3, there is no effect for attitudes towards immigrants of same ethnicity as majority in a country - something that was not at the center of the stage at a time.

Table 3: Spillovers of attitudes towards immigrants: allow more immigrants of same ethnicity as majority

VARIABLES	(1) Full Same Immigr	(2) Full Same Immigr	(3) High Same Immigr	(4) Low Same Immigr
Allow Same. Immigrants (ancestral)	0.089 (0.057)	0.045 (0.068)	0.176 (0.100)	0.067 (0.084)
Allow Same. Immigrants (ancestral) x post		0.107 (0.095)		
Observations	19,277	19,277	7,146	12,131
Number of mcountry_	35	35	10	25
Adjusted R-squared	0.102	0.102	0.136	0.090
Ancestral FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Cluster-Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## 4.2 Spillovers to the US

While the spillover effects within Europe can be interesting by themselves, here I ask whether events happening in Europe can exert a spillover effect on the attitudes and behaviors in the US, via the networks of immigrant/ethnic ties. Table 4 shows that this is indeed the case. Namely, the table shows that a higher refugee 'treatment' in the ancestral country in Europe makes people of that ancestry living in the US more politically conservative (self-reported GSS measure). Moreover, we see that the effect becomes weaker for people from families that have immigrated to the US more generations ago. Moreover, there is a seemingly surprising effect for Germany: a reverse effect in a sense that people of German ancestry become more liberal following an intensification of refugees inflows into Germany. I will discuss later on why this may be the case (forthcoming).

Table 4: Spillovers of the Refugee Crisis in the US: Political conservatism

VARIABLES	(1) OLS Conserv	(2) OLS Conserv	(3) OLS Conserv	(4) OLS Conserv	(5) OLS Conserv	(6) OLS Conserv	(7) WOLS Conserv	(8) OLS Conserv
Refugees (pop share)	41.213*** (10.443)	40.171*** (10.241)	58.853*** (8.139)	29.095*** (5.871)	18.190* (8.683)	-86.058** (40.931)	58.888*** (12.528)	
Refugees infl. (pop share)								20.204*** (2.204)
Observations	1,324	1,324	1,304	4,336	3,032	370	1,674	1,335
Adjusted R-squared	0.012	0.016	0.413	0.436	0.445	0.399	0.525	0.410
Ancestral FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	2 <sup>nd</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup> , 3 <sup>rd</sup> , 4 <sup>th</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	Germany	Weighted	2 <sup>nd</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup>

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table B1 in the Appendix shows additional results from the GSS, using different outcome measures.

## 4.3 Facebook Social Connectedness and Ancestry Shares

To support the idea that in the US, people's attitudes and behaviors may be affected in 'real time' by the events and attitudes in their ancestral countries, below I provide suggestive evidence that for many ancestries, social networks between the US counties and European countries are still strongly representative of the US countries' ancestral composition.

The figures below are constructed using two main data sources. First, I use the data from Facebook friendships links, Bailey et al. (2018), at the level of (US counties - European

countries) pairs. The Social Connectedness Index (SCI) measures the intensity of social connectedness between any locations based on users information and activity on Facebook. Formally,

$$SCI_{i,j} = \frac{Connections_{i,j}}{Users_i \cdot Users_j} \quad (3)$$

The measure of SCI that I use is scaled such that the maximum value is 1000000000, and a minimum value is 1.

The second source of data is the US American Community Survey (5-year estimates), using which I can calculate ancestral population shares in each county and for each ancestral country in Europe.

On Figure 2 below, I report the correlation between the SCI and the ancestral shares at the (US county - European country) pair level, adjusted for the European county FEs and US county FEs. This strong, positive, and significant correlation suggests that counties in the US that have a higher share of people with a certain European ancestry also have a significantly higher Facebook connectivity with people from that European country. On Figure 3, I demonstrate the same idea, restricting the ancestry to Italy, to show that within a given ancestry, there is also a strong association across counties. However, there is also a large variation in the extent to which these ancestral ties are observed across the European origin countries. For example, for France or Netherlands the extent to which ancestral shares reflect connectivity to Europe is much lower than that of Italy or Turkey.

Overall, it seems that the ancestral composition of local population still affects the connectivity of people to their ancestral countries today via social media, such as Facebook. Thus, it might be reasonable to expect that one of the mechanisms behind the spillover effects from the Refugee Crisis documented above has something to do with the acquisition of information and values transmission from abroad via ancestral/immigrant ties in social/media networks.




Figure 2: Correlation of the Ancestral Composition and Facebook Connectivity at the US county-European country level




Figure 3: Correlation of the Ancestral Composition and Facebook Connectivity: Italian Ancestry

## References

- Ahern, Kenneth R., Ran Duchin, and Tyler Shumway, "Peer Effects in Risk Aversion and Trust," 2014, *27* (11), 3213–3240.
- Angrist, Joshua D., "The perils of peer effects," 2014, *30*, 98–108.
- Bailey, Michael, Drew Johnston, Martin Koenen, Theresa Kuchler, Dominic Russel, and Johannes Stroebel, "Social Networks Shape Beliefs and Behavior: Evidence from Social Distancing During the Covid-19 Pandemic," 2020, (ID 3753144).
- , Ruiqing Cao, Theresa Kuchler, and Johannes Stroebel, "The Economic Effects of Social Networks: Evidence from the Housing Market," 2018, *126* (6), 2224–2276.

- Barsbai, Toman, Hillel Rapoport, Andreas Steinmayr, and Christoph Trebesch**, “The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic,” 2017, *9* (3), 36–69.
- Bo, Ernesto Dal, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne**, “Economic Losers and Political Winners: Sweden’s Radical Right,” 2019, p. 44.
- Boxell, Levi, Matthew Gentzkow, and Jesse Shapiro**, “Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization,” 2020.
- Bramoullé, Yann, Habiba Djebbari, and Bernard Fortin**, “Peer Effects in Networks: A Survey,” 2020, *12* (1), 603–629.
- Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde**, “The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes,” 2012, *79* (2), 645–677.
- Dustmann, Christian, Kristine Vasiljeva, and Anna Piil Damm**, “Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes,” 2019, *86* (5), 2035–2091.
- Fernández, Raquel**, “Women, Work, and Culture,” 2007, *5* (2), 305–332.
- Galor, Oded and Ömer Özak**, “The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference,” 2016, *106* (10), 3064–3103.
- Hangartner, Dominik, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos, and Dimitrios Xefteris**, “Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?,” 2019, *113* (2), 442–455.
- Luttmer, Erzo F. P and Monica Singhal**, “Culture, Context, and the Taste for Redistribution,” 2011, *3* (1), 157–179.
- Manski, Charles F.**, “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem,” 1993, *60* (3), 531.
- Steinmayr, Andreas**, “Contact versus Exposure: Refugee Presence and Voting for the Far-Right,” 2020, pp. 1–47.
- Tian, Yuan, Maria Esther Caballero, and Brian Kovak**, “Social Learning along International Migrant Networks,” 2020.

# Appendix

## A. Figures




Figure A1: European Refugee Crisis, Eurostat and Frontex

## B. Tables

Table B1: GSS additional outcomes

VARIABLES	(1) OLS Poor help self	(2) OLS Too much on SS	(3) OLS Too much on WF
Refugees (pop share)	9.214** (3.321)	9.489** (3.758)	22.717*** (6.298)
Observations	4,059	5,872	2,241
Adjusted R-squared	0.190	0.074	0.145
Ancestral FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## C. Description of variables and sources of data

Forthcoming ...