Научный семинар ИНИИ "Secret Reserve Prices and Uncertainty in Timber Auctions": Павел Андреянов (НИУ ВШЭ)
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6 февраля Павел Андреянов выступит с докладом "Secret Reserve Prices and Uncertainty in Timber Auctions" на регулярном научном семинаре ИНИИ.
We propose a novel explanation for the use of secret reserve prices that does not rely on risk-aversion, irrational beliefs, or non-standard preferences. If bidders are better informed than the seller about a common component of auction heterogeneity, the seller can allocate more efficiently by keeping her reserve price secret and revising it after the bids are submitted. In French timber auctions, the government uses an ex-ante secret reserve price, which can be revised down if no bid is above it. We build a model of a first-price auction under unobserved auction heterogeneity (imperfectly observed by the seller) that captures this rationale and derive conditions for identification when the auctioneer's ex-ante signal is observed. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that by allowing the seller to update the reserve price based on the collected bids, efficiency can be improved.
Начало в 18:10.
Место: Покровский бульвар 11, K416, Москва.
Рабочий язык: английский.
Вход свободный.
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Дата
6 февраля
18:10
Адрес
Покровский бульвар 11, K416, Москва
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